[BreachExchange] Equifax Breach Is a Reminder of Society’s Larger Cybersecurity Problems

Audrey McNeil audrey at riskbasedsecurity.com
Fri Sep 22 14:36:14 EDT 2017


https://www.financialsense.com/conversation/equifax-
breach-reminder-societys-larger-cybersecurity-problems

The Equifax data breach was yet another cybersecurity incident involving
the theft of significant personal data from a large company. Moreover, it
is another reminder that the modern world depends on critical systems,
networks and data repositories that are not as secure as they should be.
And it signals that these data breaches will continue until society as a
whole (industry, government, and individual users) is able to objectively
assess and improve cybersecurity procedures.

Although this specific incident is still under investigation, the fact that
breaches like this have been happening – and getting bigger – for more than
a decade provides cybersecurity researchers another opportunity to examine
why these events keep happening. Unfortunately, there is plenty of
responsibility for everyone.

Several major problems need to be addressed before people can live in a
truly secure society: For example, companies must find and hire the right
people to actually solve the overall problems and think innovatively rather
than just fixing the day-to-day issues. Companies must be made to get
serious about cybersecurity – at a time when many firms have financial
incentives not to, also. Until then, major breaches will keep happening and
may get even worse.

Finding the Right People

Data breaches are commonplace now and have widespread effects. The Equifax
breach affected more than 143 million people – far more than the 110
million victims in 2013 at Target, the 45 million TJX customers hit in
2007, and significantly more than the 20 million or so current and former
government employees in the 2015 US Office of Personnel Management
incident. Yahoo’s 2016 loss of user records, with a purported one billion
victims, likely holds the dubious record for most victims in a single
incident.

In part, cybersecurity incidents happen because of how companies – and
governments – staff their cybersecurity operations. Often, they try to save
money by outsourcing information technology management, including security.
That means much of the insight and knowledge about how networks and
computer systems work isn’t held by people who work for the company itself.
In some cases, outsourcing such services might save money in the short term
but also create a lack of institutional knowledge about how the company
functions in the long term.

Generally speaking, key cybersecurity functions should be assigned to
in-house staff, not outside contractors – and who those people also matter
a lot. In my experience, corporate recruiters often focus on identifying
candidates by examining their formal education and training along with
prior related work experience – automated resume scanning makes that quite
easy. However, cybersecurity involves both technical skills and a fair
amount of creative thinking that’s not easily found on resumes.

Moreover, the presence (or absence) of a specific college degree or
industry certification alone is not necessarily the best indicator of who
will be a talented cybersecurity professional. In the late 1990s, the best
technical security expert on my team was fresh out of college with a degree
in forest science – as a self-taught geek, he had not only the personal
drive to constantly learn new things and network with others but also the
necessary and often unconventional mindset needed to turn his cybersecurity
hobby into a productive career. Without a doubt, there are many others like
him also navigating successful careers in cybersecurity.

Certainly, people need technical skills to perform the basic functions of
their jobs – such as promptly patching known vulnerabilities, changing
default passwords on critical systems before starting to use them and
regularly reviewing security procedures to ensure they’re strong and up to
date. Knowing not to direct panicked victims of your security incident to a
fraudulent site is helpful, too.

But to be most effective over the long term, workers need to understand
more than specific products, services, and techniques. After all, people
who understand the context of cybersecurity – like communicating with the
public, managing people and processes, and modeling threats and risks – can
come from well beyond the computing disciplines.

Being Ready for Action

Without the right people offering guidance to government officials,
corporate leaders, and the public, a problem I call “cyber-complacency” can
arise. This remains a danger even though cybersecurity has been a major
national and corporate concern since the Clinton administration of the
1990s.

One element of this problem is the so-called “cyber insurance” market.
Companies can purchase insurance policies to cover the costs of response
to, and recovery from, security incidents like data breaches. Equifax’s
policy, for example, is reportedly more than US$100 million; Sony Pictures
Entertainment had in place a $60 million policy to help cover expenses
after its 2014 breach.

This sort of business arrangement – simply transferring the financial risk
from one company to another – doesn’t solve any underlying security
problems. And since it leaves behind only the risk of some bad publicity,
the company’s sense of urgency about proactively fixing problems might be
reduced. In addition, it doesn’t address the harm to individual people –
such as those whose entire financial histories Equifax stored – when
security incidents happen.

Cybersecurity problems do not have to be just another risk people accept
about using the internet. But these problems are not solved by another
national plan or government programor public grumbling about following
decades-old basic cybersecurity guidelines.

Rather, the technology industry must not cut corners when designing new
products and administering systems: Effective security guidelines and
practices – such as controlling access to shared resources and not making
passwords impossible to change in our “internet of things” devices – must
become fundamental parts of the product design process, too. And,
cybersecurity professionals must use public venues and conferences to drive
innovative thinking and action that can help fundamentally fix our
persistent cybersecurity woes and not simply sell more products and
services.

Making Vulnerability Unprofitable

Many companies, governments, and regular people still don’t follow basic
cybersecurity practices that have been identified for decades. So it’s not
surprising to learn that in 2015, intelligence agencies were exploiting
security weaknesses that had been predicted in the 1970s. Presumably,
criminal groups and other online attackers were, too.

Therefore, it’s understandable that commercialism will arise – as both an
opportunity and a risk. At present, when cybersecurity problems happen,
many companies start offering purported solutions: One industry colleague
called this the computer equivalent of “ambulance chasing.” For instance,
less than 36 hours after the Equifax breach was made public, the company’s
competitors and other firms increased their advertising of security and
identity protection services. But those companies may not be secure
themselves.

There are definitely some products and services – like identity theft
monitoring – that, when properly implemented, can help provide consumers
with reassurance when problems occur. But when companies discover that they
can make more money selling to customers whose security is violated rather
than spending money to keep data safe, they realize that it’s profitable to
remain vulnerable.

With credit-reporting companies like Equifax, the problem is even more
amplified. Consumers didn’t ask for their data to be vacuumed up, but they
are faced with bearing the consequences and the costs now that the data
have gotten loose. (And remember, the company has that insurance policy to
limit its costs.)

Government regulators have an important role to play here. Companies like
Equifax often lobby lawmakers to reduce or eliminate requirements for data
security and other protections, seek to be exempted from liability from
potential lawsuits if they minimally comply with the rules and may even try
to trick consumers into giving up their rights to sue. Proper oversight
would protect customers from these corporate harms.

Making a Commitment

I’ve argued in the past that companies and government organizations that
hold critical or sensitive information should be willing to spend money and
staff time to ensure the security and integrity of their data and systems.
If they fail, they are really the ones to blame for the incident – not the
attackers.

A National Institute of Standards and Technology researcher exemplified
this principle when he recently spoke up to admit that the complex password
requirements he helped design years ago don’t actually improve security
very much. Put another way, when the situation changes, or new facts
emerge, we must be willing to change as necessary with them.

Many of these problems indeed are preventable. But that’s true only if the
cybersecurity industry, and society as a whole, follow the lead of that
NIST researcher. We all must take a realistic look at the state of
cybersecurity, admit the mistakes that have happened and change our
thinking for the better. Only then can anyone – much less everyone – take
on the task of devoting time, money and personnel to making the necessary
changes for meaningful security improvements. It will take a long time, and
will require inconvenience and hard work. But it’s the only way forward.
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