[BreachExchange] Going down the ransomware rabbithole

Destry Winant destry at riskbasedsecurity.com
Mon Aug 5 02:17:21 EDT 2019


Looking for insights in modern literature to address the challenges
facing CISOs might seem farfetched, but there is some logic to this.
Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the
Looking Glass illustrates the challenges posed by ransomware. While
this might seem contradictory on the surface, the options and twisted
logic Alice faced are eerily similar to those posed by this pernicious

Yet fight ransomware CISOs must do, so be prepared to abandon logic
and enter the looking glass that is modern-day cybersecurity.

The good news is that there are ways to tilt those ransomware
calculations in the company’s favor so you are less likely to have to
pay the ransom. Fighting ransomware in 2019 forces CISOs to embrace
quite a few contradictions that are most vexing. Here are some to

• In a logical world, it is only the ransom-demander who is the
criminal with the enterprise target merely a victim. But in the
contrarian world of ransomware, there is an excellent chance that a
company — or a company employee — paying a ransom might be violating
federal law by sending money if the attacker is associated with
terrorists or is in a country that doesn’t play nice with the U.S.
Ultimately, you could be prosecuted for it. If you do not pay, you can
lose your data. If you do pay, you might go to jail. Tough choice.

• There is potentially more legal trouble for the ransomware victim:
Compliance and breach disclosure issues could be expensive and damage
the company image. There could be related costs, such as states that
require purchasing identity theft insurance for all impacted
consumers. But were the consumers impacted? This raises a question
that is difficult to answer: How far can a CISO trust the
representations of the attacker? The company’s decision here can have
expensive repercussions.

By all indications, an attack merely seemed to encrypt sensitive data.
But given that the bad guys needed to first access it to encrypt it,
might they have copied the data first so they could double-dip and
sell the data on the black market even if the company pays the ransom?
If the attacker has not yet done so, does that exfiltration still
trigger compliance-related costs and efforts? Are companies required
to assume that the attackers did more than they claimed? Will
regulators make that assumption? Questions like these can send even
the most grizzled CISO down the proverbial rabbit hole looking for

• As is the case when anyone is dealing with a kidnapper who demands a
ransom, it seems foolish to trust such a thief. What would stop them
from taking your ransom and then opting to renege and not release your
data? And yet, ransomware experts say that ransomware in 2019 is a
highly professional business and that these ransomware businesses,
which will often have customer service and free tech support, can be
trusted to do what they say. If they do not, their highly lucrative
business model would quickly implode. Is there a CISO or CEO willing
to take that chance?

• The official policy of just about every Fortune 1000 company is to
never pay a ransom. And yet, just about all of those same companies
routinely will pay that ransom when the ROI calculation of fighting
versus paying makes it clear that paying is better. That said, the
calculation sometimes tells companies to not pay, depending on the
situation and the nature of the attack. Was the City of Atlanta
correct in saying no to a $51,000 ransom (the exchange rate for six
bitcoin at the time of the attack) when experts say the costs to
restore the data might well reach an estimated $17 million?

• If the situation is dire enough, CISOs always retain the option of
surrendering and simply paying the ransom. And yet, many companies
then discover that the nature of buying cryptocurrency — the ransom of
choice these days — is next-toimpossible to do in volume given the
limits the system imposes on cryptocurrency brokers, especially if the
company does not have existing relationships with multiple
cryptocurrency brokers. Buying a lot of cryptocurrency to hold in
reserve for a future ransomware attack also does not work, both
because of the potential loss of value due to the dramatic shifts in
cryptocurrency exchange rates and because there is no way to know
which cryptocurrency will be demanded.

• The limits as to how much bitcoin a single broker can sell changes
from broker to broker, as do the precise procedures. Regardless, it is
critical to start establishing those relationships before an attack
hits so that your team can get as much of the paperwork wrapped before
you need the virtual currency, experts agree. A second option is to
get ransomware insurance and let the insurance company do all of that
paperwork and logistics.

• Senior executives often assert that when the time comes to deal with
ransomware, they will be the ones to decide, often in concert with the
board. And yet, some ransomware attacks are now designed for mid-level
or entry-level employees to be able to pay on their own — with demands
as low as $100 or a few hundred dollars, in cryptocurrency — so the
lowerlevel employee can, in theory, avoid the embarrassment and
potential punishment of admitting to management that they clicked on
the attachment and caused the problem.

Unraveling the contradictions

A typical first line of defense includes aggressive backups, but
attackers plan for that. Attackers often plant malware that goes
silent for weeks or more before sending a ransom demand. This is
designed to not merely infect backups with the malware, but to make it
difficult to determine exactly when the infection began. Also, even if
the security team identifies the exact date of infection, it might
mean restoring a backup from a month or longer ago, losing
considerable critical data.

This is all part of the ransomware return on investment (ROI)
strategy. Attackers want the enterprise’s ROI calculation to make it
worthwhile to pay the ransom.

The most obvious way to combat this strategy is to separate data
backups from executables backups. In theory, this would allow
protection of all data, as a database of raw data should not be able
to house a malware executable. But homegrown legacy applications,
along with legacy apps made from companies that are no longer in
business or at least no longer selling that application, make that
executable backup essential. This would suggest keeping secure backups
of all legacy code on disks that are entirely off-network, ideally
with multiple copies in multiple air-conditioned and air-gapped

Bryan Kissinger is the CISO for Banner Health, an $8.5 billion chain
of 28 hospitals along with physician groups, long-term care centers
and outpatient surgery centers in six states. Kissinger argues that
his security team has done everything it can think of to thwart a
ransomware attack.

“We’re preparing ourselves as best as we can,” Kissinger says. “We
don’t allow our workforce to have administrative privileges on
end-user devices.”

That restriction on administrative privileges is a key part of
Banner’s defense strategy. Given that the typical ransomware attack
involves attachment malware intended to compromise administrative
credentials, “we attempt to head that part off. Our remedy would be to
flush the system and reload it from a clean backup.”

Given that Banner performs backups on everything in the network —
applications, data and operating system — there is always a risk of
the malware infecting the backup so “we try and go back to a good
time.” But by sharply limiting who has administrative privileges,
Kissinger is hoping an attack would not ever touch any of the backups.

When asked about whether his firm, if indeed caught in a ransomware
web, would ever pay ransom, he says he would recommend such a payment
in only a few circumstances, such as if the system was “hopelessly
locked and if the ransom is lower than our operating costs to repair
the damage.”

Kissinger adds that it is hardly practical to have an ironclad policy
against ever paying such a ransom. “I think anyone who says flat out
‘no’ is not being realistic.”

But if it ever happened, Kissinger says, his top priority would be
identifying how the attacker got in and patching that hole. “We would
try and close the threat vector so they can’t just attack again” after
the ransom is paid, he says.

The question of whether paying encourages more ransomware is a
difficult one to answer, which is why most companies that pay do
everything they can to keep the payments secret.

“Broadly, I would advise ‘don’t pay’ because I do think it encourages
the problem,” says Sean Tierney, director of cyber intelligence for
security consulting firm Infoblox of Santa Clara, Calif. “But (CISOs)
have to be aware of what the business reality is and what the impact
of not paying will be. This does require the decision-makers to decide
in advance what their decision will likely be.”

When an enterprise is trying to craft strategies and policies to
counter today’s ransomware threats, it must look closely at its
abilities to pay a ransom if it chose to do so. Many companies have
tried and quickly discovered that the logistics of paying a large
ransom in blockchain currency can be overwhelming if arrangements have
not been put in place months earlier, says Mark Rasch, a former
federal prosecutor who today serves as a private practice
cybersecurity lawyer in Bethesda, Md.

Can I? May I? Should I?

“With ransomware, the first questions a company must address are ‘Can
I? May I? Should I?,’” Rasch says.

The “Can I?” part addresses the tricky nature of cryptocurrency. “Do I
have access to cryptocurrency — in multiple denominations and multiple
types? Anywhere from (a value of) $300 to $3 million?” Rasch asks
rhetorically. “If you have a need to deploy cryptocurrency, who in the
organization will be responsible for making that decision? And how do
you get that information to that person?”

When an attack hits, the extortionist typically gives a very short
window for paying, often 24-48 hours. That means that every minute is
critical. When some employee receives an extortion demand, does that
employee know where to send it? Does that employee’s supervisor know?
And what if the designated recipient is on vacation, traveling or
otherwise unavailable? Is there a backup assigned to handle it and is
that backup’s contact information widely known among employees? If
designated contacts and/ or their backups leave the company, is there
an immediate trigger for someone to select a replacement? Are such
plans routinely rehearsed to learn of holes?

“Who makes that decision? Is somebody is going to own that decision?”
Rasch queries. Sometimes staffers have different spending approval
limits, so it becomes a question of determining which person has the
authority to approve the ransom spend.

The “May I?” part refers to the tricky legal environment surrounding
ransomware. There are various regulatory rules — the most prominent
coming from a unit in the U.S. Treasury called the Office of Foreign
Asset and Control (OFAC) — that restricts where money can go
(prohibited countries) and people/organizations where it can go
(entities on suspected terrorist or terrorism organization lists).

This is where the nature of ransomware makes payments complicated.
Communications between the victim company and attacker typically
improves after a ransomware attack, which is at least a microdot of a
silver lining. “You’re never more secure than you are two weeks after
having been attacked. It’s a motivating event, at least temporarily.
You’re going to be doing some locking down,” Rasch says. “The idea
that paying ransomware invites more ransomware is probably not true.
But being vulnerable to ransomware probably does invite more attacks.”

Rasch argues that there really is a professionalism among many of the
larger ransomware groups and punishing a paying customer is rarely
seen. “In the incidents where I have dealt with ransomware, we haven’t
had the experience that they immediately get hit again,” Rasch says,
adding that not delivering a paid-for decryption tool is something
else that rarely if ever happens.

“They don’t make money if you can’t unlock it,” Rasch says. “They want
to be known as a trustworthy thief. They want four stars on

The final consideration, the “Should I,” essentially addresses the
aforementioned discussion on comparing the ROI of paying the ransom
versus not paying it. The CISO calculates what it will cost the
company to try and repair the damage itself—factoring in down-time,
status of backups, how long ago the system was impacted—versus paying
the ransom. It may be galling, but a hard calculation will inform the
“Should I?” decision. It also overlaps with the May I factor when it
comes to the legality of paying, plus addresses a host of business and
ethical considerations unique to each company.

Legal beagles

On other legal matters, there are the compliance issues dealing with
states and other rules requiring disclosures, and possibly consumer
insurance purchases, when Social Security numbers or other specified
personally identifiable information (PII) is stolen. Given that even a
forensic examination does not always deliver a complete and definitive
picture of what attackers did (especially given the ever-present
possibility that the bad guys manipulated security logs to hide their
true tracks), it is hard to know if data was stolen (copied and
exfiltrated) before it was encrypted.

As with almost everything in compliance, each rule depends on its
definitions and phrasing. “One of the triggers is unauthorized
access,” says Tatiana Melnik, a Tampa-based attorney who specializes
in cyber issues. “At the same time, there is a requirement under HIPAA
(Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) that requires
integrity of the data remains in place. If someone has encrypted the
data, does integrity of the data remain in place?”

The answer is to do everything your company can to determine what
happened. “If you can, see what the malicious code was intended to do.
If it was merely designed to find information and encrypt it,
arguably, it may not be a breach,” Melnik says—and then make that
argument to regulators and hope for the best.

Dante Disparte, CEO at the Washington, DC-based security consulting
firm Risk Cooperative and a member of the national report entitled
Black Market Ecosystem: Estimating the cost of ownership. “If either a
nameserver or front-end is blocked or taken offline, a new one is
automatically created in its place, allowing the back-end server
hosting the criminal customers’ content to remain online.”

Deloitte noted that companies are quite open, on the dark web, at
least, about the software suites they sell specifically for ransomware
attacks, including whether fees are flat or involve a percentage of
ransom acquired.

There is an advantage that the larger ransomware companies are so well
known. That means that their tactics are well known. Companies, such
as cyber insurance firms, often can identify the company attacking by
looking at the code used. “Is it a variant of some known code? Has it
been used before?” Rasch says.

Sometimes, attackers reuse their decryption tools and even decryption
keys, which creates the slight possibility that victims can find the
decryption items online from a recent victim of the attack rather than
from the attacker.

Another concern is about the attackerprovided decryption tool. Not
whether it will work necessarily, but how well it will work.

“In the last three months we’ve seen the Ryuk strain of ransomware
become very active. It is the fast growing ransomware strain we see,”
says Joshua Motta, CEO of San Francisco-based Coalition, a cyber
insurance company. “More worrisome is that the ransoms for Ryuk are
much larger than other strains of ransomware, totaling between $200K
to $700K.”

He adds that “Unlike previous forms of ransomware, including SamSam
and Dharma, Ryuk is extraordinarily difficult to remove. It is also
very difficult to recover from. Even if you pay the ransom, the
decryptor provided by the threat actor doesn’t work well. It does
decrypt files, but it frequently fails making recovering
extraordinarily time consuming for the victim.”

Scott Laliberte, managing director and global leader of cybersecurity
and privacy for consulting firm Protiviti of Menlo Park, Calif.,
argues that ransomware is likely to get a lot worse before it,
actually, it will just continue to get worse.

“My thoughts are that we are going to see escalation in ransomware
over the next few years. I think the payload will start moving beyond
just denying access to data to other types of actions that could
threaten harm. For example, attacking healthcare providers to put
patient lives in danger unless ransom is paid, distribution companies’
logistics systems to prevent them from making shipments, chemical
plants, threatening catastrophic accidents, etc.,” Laliberte says.

Cybercriminals will “look for ways to monetize their attacks [given
that] credit report monitoring and credit card tokenization [is
making] identity theft and credit card fraud less profitable.
Consequently, I believe [cyberthieves] will be upping the stakes. We
need to start preparing now for these types of attacks and expanding
our view of risk assessment beyond loss of confidential data.”
Laliberte says he expects IoT and mobile will be ransomware’s new
focus in the near term.

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